Judicial Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 10 | Issue 4 Article 9
1920
Judicial Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Judicial Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure, 10 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 592 (May 1919 to February 1920)
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND WILLIAm G. HALE
ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
People v. Goldberg (Ill.), 122 N. E. 530. Mistake in name.
The defendant was described in one count of the indictment as Philip
Holdberg, in another as Philup Goldberg, and in the remaining counts as
Philip Goldberg. He was found guilty under the entire fifty counts.
Held, that a motion in arrest of judgment should have been sustained.
The names Philip and Philup are idem sonans, but the names Goldberg and
Holdberg are not. The state should have nollied the count against Holdberg.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
State v. Lesesne (S. Car.), 100 S. E. 62. Deducing intent to resist arrest
from common design to flee.
Four defendants were arrested for assault and battery and convicted upon
evidence showing that all attempted to escape, that one of the arresting officers
was struck by a frying pan, but there was no evidence to show whether the
blow was struck by one of the four defendants or by one Price who has not
joined in this appeal.
Held, the conviction can be upheld on the jury finding that all had formed
a common design to escape by flight.
Hydrick, J., dissenting on the ground that proof of facts warranting an
inference" of common design to avoid arrest is not sufficient to warrant the
further inference of a common design to commit assault and battery upon an
officer who might attempt to arrest them for gambling.
ASSAULT TO MURDER.
People v. Brown (Ill.), 123 N. E. 515. Malice.
The element of malice is the same in the offense of assault with intent
to commit murder as in the crime of murder itself. The circumstances must
indicate that the attack was made with an abandoned and malignant heart, so
that if death had resulted it would have been murder.
CONSPIRACY.
State v. Taylor (N. 3.), 107 Atl. 423. Admissibility of evidence in
denial of.
On a trial for conspiracy, defendant was asked questions which sought
to establish that his alleged co-conspirator was addicted to the excessive use
of liquor, and to such an extent that he would be incapacitated for weeks at a
time, during which he was mentally incompetent and incoherent, and that those
facts were known to the defendant before and at the time it was alleged that
he entered into the conspiracy with him; the purpose being to have the jury
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pass upon the question as to whether or not it was probable to make such a
combination wiih such a man. The trial court overruled the questions, but
this was reversed by the Supreme Court on error.
Held, that the questions asked were incompetent, and that the judgment
of the Supreme Court should be reversed to the end that the trial court be
affirmed.
Minturn and Taylor, JJ., dissenting.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State v. Heitman (Kans.), 181 Pac. 630. Constitutionality of statute estab-
lishing penal farm for women.
Chapter 298 of the laws of 1917, establishing an institution known as the
industrial farm for women, for the detention and care of women convicted of
criminal offenses, does not violate any of the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, because a woman con-
victed of misdemeanor is sentenced to the farm for an undetermined period,
with a maximum limit, while a man convicted of the same misdemeanor is
sentenced, under the general law, to the county jail for a definite period, within
the same maximum limit.
State v. Moon (N. Car.), 100 S. E. 614. Validity of statute denouncing co-
habitation after bigamous marriage in another state.
Revisal, 1905, sec. 3361, as amended by Laws, 1913, c. 26, denouncing co-
habitation within North Carolina after bigamous marriage outside of the
state.
Held, not constitutional as punishing for a crime committed outside of
the terretorial limits of the state, following similar decisions in Alabama, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Tennessee, and Vermont.
DESERTION AND NON-SUPPORT.
Ex parte Brennan (Nev.), 183 Pac. 310. Venue.
Prosecution of husband for desertion and non-support of wife and child
under Act of Pennsylvania, March 13, 1903 (P. L. 26), need not be instituted
at the place of his residence, or county in which offense was alleged to have
been committed, but may be instituted wherever relief may be needed; such
statute, in view of sec. 2, and in view of Act, April 13, 1867 (P. L. 78), to
which it is supplementary, being remedial as well as penal, with purpose of
affording relief to dependent wives and children.
DISORDERLY HOUSE.
People v. Ryberg (Ill.), 122 N. E. 545. Permitting an umnarried female
under 18 to stop in an assignation house.
The defendant was convicted under Hurd's Rev. Stat, C. 38, sec. 57d, of
allowing an unmarried female under the age of 18 years to live, board, stop and
room in a house of prostitution.
Held, "It is not an element of this crime that the female was practicing
prostitution there, or that she shall be even lacking in virtue. The statute
was designed for the protection of girls, and if the keeper of such house per-
mitted one of the prohibited class to stay therein, she did so at her peril."
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
State v. Mowser (N. J.), 106 Atl. 416. Former conviction of robbery as a
bar to further prosecution for murder.
Held, that under Crimes Act, sec. 106, providing that any person who kills
another in attempting to commit a robbery shall be guilty of murder, where
defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment for robbery, his conviction barred a
subsequent prosecution against him for murder of person robbed, when defend-
ant's accomplice killed him to accomplish the robbery.
Walker, Ch., and Williams, J., dissenting.
State v. Slorat (Me.), 106 Atl. 768. Discharge of jury for "urgent neces-
sity."
Defendant accused of murder, when jury which was to view the locus of
crime reached the premises, fell or threw himself down and cried in the presence
of the jury, "My God! take me away from here or I shall be insane again."
Held, there was such "urgent necessity" created as to warrant presiding
justice in withdrawing case from the jury.
Nor was such discharge a bar to another trial on the same indictment.
EVIDENCE.
People v. Curtis (N. Y.), 122 N. E. 623. Res Gestae. Spontaneous ex-
clamations.
The defendant ran his automobile against a vehicle and threw the occupant
out. The automobile was stopped while some one who was riding with the de-
fendant got out and investigated. This person shortly re-entered the car and
the defendant drove on. Within ten seconds after the defendant left, the
injured man was heard to cry out, "Oh, my God, get me help; get me a doctor."
Held, this remark was admissible as part of the res gestae. The test of the
admissibility of such declarations is stated as follows: "The admission in evi-
dence of the declarations of an injured person constitutes an exception to the
general rule that excludes hearsay evidence, and is justified when the declara-
tions are so spontaneous or natural as to exclude the idea of fabrication."
FORGERY.
State v. Frasier (Ore.), 180 Pac. 520. Canceled check.
A canceled check or check indorsed and stamped "Paid" may be the sub-
ject of forgery under L. 0. L., sec. 1996, such an instrument serving in -the
business world as a voucher or receipt for the payment of the amount of
money -named in the check.
HABEAS CORPUS.
Runley v. McCarthy, U. S. Marshall, 39 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 483. Scope of
writ.
Petitioner's contention that he could not be punished for failure to report
to the alien property custodian, as required by Trading with the Enemy Act,
sec. 7 (Comp. Stat, 1918, sec. 3115yd), because such report would show that
he had been trading with the enemy in violation of the act and compel him
to bear witness against himself contrary to the Fifth Amendment, is unavail-
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able on habeas corpus to obtain discharge from commitment into custody for
removal to the District of Columbia, where the indictment was returned; the
constitutional question being matter for defense.
The chief justice dissenting.
HOMICIDE.
State v. Bethune (S. Car.), 99 S. E. 753. Resisting unlawful arrest.
One has the right to defend himself from an unlawful arrest, and for the
purpose of so protecting himself may use whatever force is necessary, even
to the extent of taking the life of him who is seeking to make the unlawful
arrest, if that be apparently necessary to a man of ordinary courage in the
circumstances.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
United States v. Ferger, 39 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 445. Counterfeiting bills of
lading.
The power of Congress, under Const., art. 1, sec. 8, to regulate foreign
and interstate commerce and to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution such power, includes the power exercised in Act
August 29, 1916, sec. 41, to penalize counterfeiting and use of a fictitious
bill of lading, where there was no actual or contemplated commerce; com-
merce being interfered with by sudh an instrument.
Mr. Justice Pitney dissenting.
JUVENILE COUiRT.
Lindsey v. People (Colo.), 181 Pac. 631. Statement to juvenile court
judge-when privileged.
In prosecution of a mother for the murder of the father, statement of
twelve-year-old son to juvenile court judge was not privileged upon judge
being called as witness, irrespective of statute, since benefit to be obtained
by correct disposal of the litigation was infinitely greater than any injury
which could possibly inure to the relation by disclosure of the communication.
Nor is such a statement privileged under Rev. Stat., 1908, sec. 586, as
amended by Laws, 1909, p. 334, the boy not being a ward of the court, nor
under sec. 7274, par. 5, making communications to a public officer in official
confidence privileged when public interests, in judgment of the court, would
suffer; the presiding judge and not witness being sole judge as to necessity
regarding communication as privileged.
Nor was such statement privileged by reason of the supposed powers and
duties conferred by statute in its capacity of parens patriae upon the judge and
his assumed position in loco parentis, and if such privilege existed it was for
the benefit of the boy and not his mother or the judge.
Bailey, Scott, and Allen, JJ., dissenting.
LARcENY.
State v. Donoavan (Wash.), 183 Pac. 127. Outlawed whiskey as the subject
of larceny.
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Outlawed whiskey may be the subject of grand larceny where taken from
one claiming ownership, although the law would not afford any damages for
its taking or give any one relief looking to its recovery.
LiliTATIoNs.
State v. Gregory (N. J.), 107 At. 459.
The defendant was indicted and convicted of a conspiracy to cheat and
defraud. One of the conspirators, by a false representation, obtained from
the victim of the conspirators, $25,000, upon an agreement to divide it equally
among the conspirators; but he falsely represented to them that he obtained
only $20,000, which was divided, defendant getting a share. Subsequently,
defendant ascertaining that he had been defrauded by his co-conspirator,
demandef and was paid a share of the residue of the money extorted.
The first division was more than two years prior to the finding of the
indictment, but the last was within the statutory limitation.
Held, that the last division was a continuance of the conspiracy, and that
the original conspiracy to cheat and defraud a person and divide the proceeds'
was hot completed until after the contemplated division of the proceeds was
finally concluded, and if there was a division within two years, that being the
statutory limitation, before the indictment was found, the statute was not a
bar because the crime was not concluded by the limitation until two years
after the last overt act in furtherance of the corrupt agreement.
MOTOR VEHICLE LAW.
People v. Johnson (Ill.), 123 N. E. 543. Destruection or concealment of
mzanufacturer's identification mark.
The following section of the Motor Vehicle Law was held constitu-
tional: "Any person having in his or her possession any motor bicycle or
motor vehicle from which the manufacturer's serial number, or any other
manufacturer's trade or distinguishing number or identification mark, has been
removed, defaced, covered, or destroyed for the purpose of concealing or
destroying the identity of such motor bicycle or motor vehicle shall be liable
to a fine of not more than two hundred dollars ($200.00) or imprisonment
in the county jail for a period not to exceed six (6) months, or both."
PAROLE LAW.
People v. Moses (I1l.), 123 N. E. 634. Conspiracy-sentence to definite
term.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of conspiracy to defraud and
sentenced to a definite term of 18 months in the state penitentiary. One of the
alleged errors was that the trial court directed the jury to fix the punish-
ment, whereas the parole law requires an indeterminate sentence. The judg-
ment was affirmed on the ground that the parole law does not apply to the
crime of conspiracy. The argument in support of this view is that the punish-
ment fixed by the Criminal Code for this crime is imprisonment for not more
than five years, or a fine not exceeding $2,000, or both. By construction the
minimum term in such case is one day. Since under the parole law no one is
eligible to parole until he has served at least one year, it could not apply to
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the crime of conspiracy unless it had the effect of amending the provision of
the criminal code by increasing the minimum term of imprisonment from one
day to one year. To give it such a meaning wofild render it unconstitutional.
The decision is also explicit in holding that under no circumstances is a
person eligible to parole until he has served at least a term of one year of
imprisonment, and if the minimum term provided by iaw exceeds one year,
then the prisoner must serve that minimum term before he can be paroled.
PLEADING.
Bennett v. State (Ind.), 123 N. E. 797. Defective indictment.
The defendant was convicted of assault and battery under an indictment
which was intended to charge the offense of assault and battery with intent
to commit murder. The indictment was defective in respect of the more
serious offense, but properly charged the lesser offense.
Held, conviction sustained conviction of the lesser offense only, made the
defect in the indictment immaterial.
Fountain v. Maryland (Court of Appeals of Md., No. 23) (July, 1919).
Presence of mob threatening prisoner as basis for postponement of trial.
During the trial of the accused, a negro, for rape, a large mob gathered
about the court house and jail with a view to seizing and lynching him. About
ten o'clock p. m., on the first day of the trial, at the close of a night session of
the court, while the prisoner was being taken from the court house to the
-jail, the mob made a determined and violent effort to take him from the
custody of the officers. During the melee the prisoner escaped. Thereafter,
in the presence of the jury the court commented "upon the disgraceful pro-
ceeding resulting in the escape of the prisoner," offered a reward of five
thousand dollars for his capture and safe return and suggested the swearing
in of all those assembled, who would volunteer as deputy sheriffs for that
purpose. Two days later the accused was captured and returned into cus-
tody, and the trial was resumed. Rumors that the former mob was to be
increased by three or four thousand, led the court to accept the offer of the
governor of the state to send a company of militia and to call for twenty-five
members of the Baltimore police force, all of whom were used as guards about
the court house and jail. The jurymen were escorted through rows of the
militiamen who stood with drawn bayonets.
When court reconvened the defendant filed a motion for a postponement
of the trial. The motion set out the facts above enumerated and averred
that the defendant "by reason of the interruption of the orderly procedure
of the administration of justice due to mob violence actually perpetrated upon
him while in the custody of the law and in the actual trial of his case (from
which mob violence he attempted to escape by flight because of the insuffi-
cient protection of law), finds himself so prejudiced in the further progress
of said case as to be utterly and hopelessly unable to receive a fair and
impartial trial by any further action in the present so-called trial and pro-
ceeding, and that the same amounts to a denial of all constitutional guarantees
of a fair and impartial trial, or to the constitutional right of a jury trial."
The motion was denied, the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to death.
On July 17, 1919, the Maryland Court of Appeals filed an opinion reversing the
judgment and awarding a new trial. The trial court said in part:
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"The appeal in this case presents a question of vital importance in the
administration of justice. It is concerned with the right of a person charged
with crime t6 have the questioff of his guilt or innocence determined by a fair
and impartial trial according to law. This right is absolute and fundamental.
It rests upon the clearest and strongest principles of justice, and it is safe-
guarded in the most imperative terms by constitutional provisions which
directly declare the will and mandate of the people.
"The issue tried before the jury in this case was whether the prisoner
at the bar, who is a colored man, was in fact the negro who committed the
rape charged in the indictment. There was no question that the unfortunate
girl who testified as prosecuting witness had been brutally outraged, but the
defense was that the accused was not the perpetrator of the horrible crime,
and that he was in reality a number of miles distant from the scene of the
assault at the time it occurred. It was his undoubted right to raise such an
issue of fact and to have it determined by the verdict of a jury under cir-
cumstances which would enable it to exercise its independent judgment. He
was entitled to have the verdict represent solely the effect of the evidence -and
not the influence of popular sentiment. In order that the defense interposed
might be impartially considered it was necessary that the jurors should have
the opportunity to calmly weigh the evidence without having their minds dis-
tracted and dominated by undue manifestations of public hostility against the
prisoner.
"The conditions under which the appellant was tried were such as to make
it almost impossible for the issue upon which his life depended to be impar-
tially considered and decided by the jury. It is in the highest degree im-
probable thajthe jury as a whole could have kept its judgment free from the
influence of the demonstrations made against the accused in the immediate
neighborhood of the court in which the trial was being conducted. The pres-
ence of a large and menacing crowd determined that the prisoner should die
and unwilling to await the orderly processes of the law, which had been set in
motion with the utmost promptness, the attempt to forestall by lynching the
verdict of the jury and a judicial sentence, the flight of the defendant to
escape immediate death at the hands of the mob, and the unusual measures
taken by the court to insure his safety when recaptured, evidencing the belief
of the judges as to the extreme gravity of the emergency with which they
were confronted, combined to create an atmosphere and environment in-
compatible with the right of the accused to a fair and impartial trial. .
"It is not our duty or right to pass upon the weight of the evidence and to
express an opinion as to its sufficiency to support the verdict actually ren-
dered. That was a question which the appellant was entitled to have decided
by a jury exempt from such influences as those which operated in this case
and by which any jury of ordinary human sensibilities would have been
practically certain to have been affected prejudicially to the accused.
"It is natural that popular wrath and indignation should be aroused by such
an atrocious offense as this record discloses. But the identification and pun-
ishment of the criminal must be left to the careful and regular processes of
the law, however deep and just may be the public sense of horror at the
crime. The law does not tolerate any interference with the right of the hum-
blest individual to be accorded equal and exact justice, and, when charged
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 599
with crime, to have the question of his guilt or innocence fairly and impar-
tially determined. It is of the highest concern to the people and courts alike
that this vital and sacred right shall be preserved inviolate."
It seems superfluous to add anything by way of argument in support of a
decision so obviously sound. In these days of prevalent disorder it is highly
desirable to exalt and safeguard the established machinery of righteous gov-
ernment. And it is not too much to expect that all those who are worthy of
the name as good citizens will now as never before stand vigorously for law
and order and patiently abide the results of the orderly administration of
justice. Decisions of the character here presented are timely.-William G. Hale.
RAPE.
Branham v. State (Okla.), 182 Pac. 585. Previous chaste character.
In a prosecution for statutory rape of a female over 16 and under 18
years of age, evidence of an act of criminal intercourse by the defendant and
prosecutrix, prior to the time of the specific act of sexual intercourse charged
in the information, does not show that the prosecutrix was not of chaste
and virtuous character. A defendant cannot shelter under a violation of a
criminal law by him 'and thereby escape prosecution.
Williams v. State (Okla.), 184 Pac. 788. Proof of defendants age in statu-
tory rape a matter of defense.
Sec. 2415, Rev. Laws, 1910, providing, "Nor can any person be convicted of
rape on account of an act of sexual intercourse with a female over the age of
fourteen years, with her consent, unless such person was over the age of
eighteen years at the time of such act."
Construed and held, that proof that defendant was over the age of eighteen
years at the time of the commission of the alleged act is not indispensable to
a conviction; the age of defendant being a matter of defense, and not a
material element of the crime.
SEDITION.
State v. Kahn (Mont.), 182 Pac. 107. Right of state to punish sedition.
Grant of war powers to Congress by Const., U. S., art. 1, sec. 8, construed
with article 6, making the laws of the United States the supreme law of the
land, and article 1, sec 10, forbidding state to engage in war unless in imminent
danger, is not so exclusive as to prohibit definition and punishment of sedi-
tion, as is done by Laws, 1918 (extra sess.), ch. 11, in view of Const., U. S.,
Amend. 10, giving states powers not delegated, as state is in duty bound to aid
United States in war, as is recognized in Const., Mont., art. 12, sec. 12.
SENTENCE.
Harris v. State (Okla.), 181 Pac. 944. Ambiguous verdict.
Where jury by one verdict assessed a fine of $50 and 30 days' imprisonment,
and by another a fine of $500 and 6 months' imprisonment, without designating
in either verdict the name of either H or D, jointly tried for unlawful pos-
session of intoxicating liquor, it was impossible to say that they,showed an
intention to give H the maximum punishment, and court's maximum sentence
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against him should be modified to provide a fine of $50 and imprisonment
of 30 days.
State v. Moran (Nev.), 182 Pac. 927. Validity of Nevada suspended sen-
tence statute.
Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 7259, authorizing court to suspend sentence except
in specified cases is unconstitutional; there being no constitutional authority
therefor, and method of suspending sentence provided in Const., art. 5, secs.
13, 14, being exclusive. Where the constitution enumerates certain cases in
which the collection of a fine may be suspended, or certain methods whereby
it may be done, or confers such power upon certain officials, the power so
conferred is exclusive.
TalL.
Fountain v. State (Md.), 107 At. 554. Mob violence as ground for giving
negro defendant contimance.
Where a negro being tried for rape was assaulted by a mob, which tried
to lynch him while he was being taken from the court house to the jail, but
he escaped in the resulting confusion and was recaptured within a few days
and his trial continued, under protection of the state militia, over objection
that public feeling prevented a fair trial.
Held, that refusal to grant continuance constituted an abuse of discre-
tion.
Steel v. State (Ga.), 99 S. E. 305. Omission to permit accused to make
statement before sentence.
Held, no error for trial court, before imposing sentence upon one con-
victed of a capital offense to omit to ask the accused what he has to say as
to why sentence should not be pronounced upon him. Especially is this so
where it does not appear that the accused has suffered injury thereby.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State v. Emonds (Wash.), 182 Pac. 584. Validity of statutory punishment
for illegal issuance of prescriptions for intoxicating liquor.
Initiative Measure Number 3 (Laws, 1915, p. 6), sec. 8, providing, among
other things, that it shall be unlawful for a physician, after he has been
convicted a second time of a violation of any of the provisions of the act, to
thereafter write any prescription for the furnishing, delivery or sale of
intoxicating liquor, is valid.
